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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Fiscal equalisation refers to attempts within a federal system of government to 
reduce fiscal disparities among jurisdictions, which emerge due to variation in sub-
national jurisdictions ability to raise revenues to meet the public expenditure needs of 
their residents. This is because of an imbalance in the assignment of revenue sources to 
sub-national levels and their expenditure needs, given the allocation of the inter-
governmental fiscal powers and responsibilities.  
In the Pakistani context, the need for transfers is highlighted by the fact that while 
provincial governments generate only about 8 percent of total national resources, their 
share in total public spending is 28 percent. Also the fiscal capacity of the four provinces 
varies, with the relatively more developed provinces being able to self-generate a higher 
proportion of their resource requirements. As such, transfers take place, according to the 
provisions of the National Finance Commission (NFC) awards, with the objective of 
removing both vertical and horizontal imbalances between own-revenues and 
expenditure.  
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the NFC awards have contributed 
to the process of fiscal equalisation in Pakistan and if so, to what extent. We start by first 
highlighting some theoretical issues in the study of fiscal equalisation in Section 2. 
Section 3 presents international practices in fiscal equalisation. Section 4 reviews the 
various NFC awards and presents the province-wise trend in federal transfers. Section 5 
describes the methodology used in this paper to measure the extent of fiscal equalisation 
with the help of an index. Section 6 describes the trend in the fiscal equalisation index. 
Finally, in Section 8 are presented the conclusions. 
 
2.  SOME CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 
The increasing international trend towards fiscal decentralisation has made the 
subject both more important and perhaps more controversial. Several issues have been 
subject to intensive debate. These include the reasons for introducing some form of 
equalising policy. The basic question is would it not be simpler to reassign functions and 
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revenues? Further, if equalisation is necessary or unavoidable, how are fiscal disparities 
measured across jurisdictions and how is equalisation best achieved? 
The case for equalisation must be examined in the context of the fiscal design of 
the federalism and decentralisation. Preferably the allocation of revenue sources among 
government tiers should follows the assignment of functions. However a number of 
problems arise from this preposition. First, allocation of expenditure responsibilities and 
tax sources should be governed by a set of principles including those based on efficiency 
and equity. According to Shah (1994) and Pasha (1997) assignments of functions are 
primarily based on efficiency considerations including spatial externalities, economies of 
scale, administrative and compliance costs and preservation of internal common market. 
As opposed to this, taxes are assigned on the basis of degree of mobility of tax bases, 
efficiency in tax administration, avoidance of ‗tax exporting‘, etc. These considerations 
are particularly important in the context of developing countries where institutional 
capacities are limited. As such the matching of expenditures and resources at the sub-
national level may not always be feasible or desirable. 
Second, even if overall balance between functions and resources is largely 
achieved at every government tier, the balance may not be obtained for each unit 
within a particular tier. Also, decentralised functions undergo modification over time, 
following changes in the preferences for service provision or in the technology of 
public good production. Therefore a unit-by-unit allocation of functions and 
resources and their periodic adjustment is likely to be a perilous if not an impossible 
political exercise.  
The next important issue in the debate on financial equalisation is how should the 
disparities be measured or what should be the level of fiscal equalising transfers? The 
concept of fiscal disparities and its measurement is complex and indeed controversial. 
Views of analysts have evolved over time. Initially, there is a need to distinguish between 
differences that result because of local choices in the fiscal expenditure mix from those 
that are arise due to low tax base and high fiscal needs, which are largely outside the 
control of sub-national governments. The latter is referred to as ―disparities‖, arising 
because the capacity to raise revenue to finance publicly provided services and the 
amount needed to provide these goods is not matched [Ladd (1999)].  
Literature on the design of equalisation transfers distinguishes between revenue 
equalisation and expenditure, or need, equalisation. The combination of both is referred 
to as need-capacity gap equalisation. Broadway and Flatters (1982), on economic 
efficiency grounds, advocate a focus on differences in net fiscal benefits across 
jurisdictions. They call for full equalisation of differences in tax revenues. Auld and Eden 
(1984) also conclude that revenue equalisation programs are consistent with economic 
theory. 
However, proponents of the need to remove horizontal fiscal imbalances argue 
that equalisation transfers should consider both expenditure needs and revenue means in 
determining the equalisation entitlements [Musgrave (1961), Le Grand (1975), Shah 
(1994)]. The constraint is in the implementation of this principle. ―The distinctions 
between differences in needs, costs and expenditures or the need-capacity gap, is far from 
evident and presents a great deal of conceptual and technical difficulties‖ [Dafflon 
(2007)]. 
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According to Faber and Otter (2003) resource equalisation is an established policy 
in most decentralised and federal countries. Over the past few decades revenue 
equalisation has taken a wide variety of forms. Redistributive effects depend on the 
equalisation formula as well as the effects of the ceiling and floor provision. Also since 
beneficiary jurisdictions differ in size and population, the redistribution between 
jurisdictions must take into account the population of each jurisdiction. This is accounted 
for by focusing on per capita revenues. In this paper fiscal equalisation is measured on 
the basis of revenue equalisation.  
 
3.  INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES OF FISCAL EQUALISATION 
In order to correct vertical and horizontal imbalances, both federations and 
decentralised unitary systems have made arrangements for financial transfers from one 
level of government to another. The relative size and structures of these transfers differ 
considerably. Because most central governments have control over the major tax sources, 
arrangements have usually taken the form of financial transfers to the states, although 
occasionally they have taken the form of some state transfers to central governments or 
inter-state transfers for equalisation purposes.  
Table 1 gives an indication of the significance of total central transfers to correct both 
vertical and horizontal imbalances as a share of the total constituent unit revenues. This 
measures the extent of dependence of sub-national governments on transfers. It appears that 
dependence of states on transfers is generally higher in federations as compared to unitary 
governments and in transitional or new federations (like South Africa, Pakistan, India). 
Transfers to sub-national governments have generally taken various forms. The first is 
revenue sharing, that is, shares in the proceeds of specified central taxes. The second type is 
unconditional grants. The third is conditional grants for specific purposes requiring the 
recipient governments to meet certain conditions or to match from their own revenues the 
central grants. The extent to which these transfers have been used varies considerably. 
 
Table 1 
Central Transfers as Percent of Total Constituent Unit Revenues 
(States and Local) 
Country Total Transfers Conditional Transfers 
Mature Federations 
  Australia 45.3 21.3 
  United States 29.6 29.6 
  Germany 43.8 9.8 
  Canada 19.8 15.8 
  Switzerland 24.8 17 
Transitional Federations 
  Pakistan 85.1 – 
  Spain 72.8 41.9 
  South Africa 96.1 11.0 
  Brazil 30.0 7.5 
  India 46.0 18.7 
Mature Unitary Systems 
  Japan 37.2 16.2 
  Sweden 15.8 4.4 
Source:  Watts (2005). 
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Revenue sharing is the most widespread practice. The Constitution stipulates 
sharing of key taxes in many countries. In Germany, for example, revenue from the 
central income taxes, corporation and turnover taxes are shared. In Australia, the Goods 
and Services Tax is transferred unconditionally to the states. In South Africa, revenue 
sharing is applied to all central taxes. In India, some duties (like stamp duties) are levied 
by the central government but are entirely collected and appropriated by the states. Some 
taxes are both levied and collected by the central government but the proceeds are 
assigned to those states in which they have been collected on the basis of the origin 
principle. As opposed to this, revenue-sharing also takes place on the basis of a 
distribution formula given frequently by constitutionally mandated quinquennial Finance 
Commissions.  
Given that in many cases revenue-sharing of central tax proceeds has been 
constitutionally mandated, some analysts classify them as a form of state revenues rather 
than as a transfer. However, that can be misleading for, unlike their own taxes and user 
fees, the states have no control on the size of the revenues they will receive as this is 
determined by the rates and levels of central taxation. They are, therefore, better 
classified as transfers. They share the characteristics of unconditional central grants, but 
have the further advantage that instead of being determined as a fixed amount by the 
central government, they are based on a specified share of major taxes and, therefore, rise 
as the economy grows. This explains why they have been so widely used as the key 
mechanism to reduce inter-governmental fiscal imbalances. 
The arrangements for removing or reducing horizontal imbalances among sub-
national governments in some countries are set out in summary form in Box 1.  
 
Box 1 
Equalisation Arrangements  
Switzerland  Federal transfers based on formulae involving a range of criteria 
ranking cantons by financial capacity as the basis for tax-sharing and 
conditional grants, but the equalising transfer system is smaller than 
in Germany, Canada and Australia. 
Canada  Federal transfers: stand-alone equalisation scheme based on formula 
(adjusted from time to time) assessing provincial revenue capacity in 
terms of 33 provincial tax and non-tax revenue sources against a 
middle range five-province standard and providing unconditional 
grants representing 42 percent of all transfers. 
Australia  Federal transfers: based between 1933 and 1981-82 on 
recommendations derived from determination of needs of claimant 
states by a standing independent Commonwealth Grants 
Commission; after 1981-82 took the form of adjustments to the 
general Adjustment Grant transfers based on calculation of 
relativities of expenditure needs among states; since 2000 based on 
application of relativities to distribution of central GST tax. 
Allocation by CGC based on calculation of revenue capacity and 
expenditure needs from comparisons of 18 revenue categories and 41 
expenditure categories. 
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Germany  Primarily inter-state transfers (62 percent): equalisation through an 
inter-state revenue pool to which rich Lander pay and from which 
poor Lander draw according to a formula; plus federal transfers (38 
percent): Federal Supplementary Payments of 1.5 percent of value-
added tax (VAT). The primary per capita distribution of the shares of 
the Lander of a portion of the VAT also has an equalising effect. 
India  Federal transfers from a pool of all union taxes supplemented by 
unconditional grants, based on the recommendations of quinquennial 
Finance Commissions recommending both the share to be allocated 
to the states as a group, and the allocation among states taking 
account of population, per capita income, area, economic and rural 
infrastructure needs, and tax effort. 
Spain  Federal transfers: since 1987 criteria including population, size, 
personal income, fiscal effort, number of internal provinces within 
Autonomous Community, and distance to state capital; applied by 
federal government to shares of federal tax revenue transferred to 
Autonomous Communities. 
Brazil  Distribution of state participation fund (state share of three main 
federal taxes) with participation coefficient for each state based 
mainly on redistributive criteria (85 percent of fund goes to poorer 
regions in the North, Northeast, and West-West). A similar fund for 
municipalities is less redistributive and more population based. 
South Africa  General national revenue-sharing transfer, with National 
Government distribution of ―equitable shares‖ among provinces 
following recommendations of Financial and Fiscal Commission 
based on demographic profiles of provinces comprising an education 
share, a health share, a social security share, and population, backlog, 
economic activity and institutional components. 
Sweden  Cost equalisation transfers based on 15 indices: municipalities and 
country councils whose per capita income is below national average 
receive a grant and those above pay a fee (i.e. scheme is self-
balancing), plus a supplementary block grant from the central 
government containing a population-related and age-related portion. 
Implemented by an Equalisation Commission. 
Japan  Local Allocation Tax (the main central government unconditional 
revenue-sharing transfer) is distributed to local governments on a 
uniform formula based on basic financial need and basic financial 
capacity. 
Source: Shah (1994). 
 
4.  A REVIEW OF THE NFC AWARDS 
The history of revenue sharing in the sub-continent can be traced back to pre-
partition days. Since partition, eight revenue-sharing awards have been announced in 
Pakistan. The first award was the Raisman award of 1951. This was followed by National 
Finance Commission awards in 1961-62, 1964, 1970, 1974, 1990, 1996, and 2009. The 
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1990 award was delayed for a considerable period. Two NFCs were formed in 1979 and 
1985 but no awards were announced due to lack of consensus among the federating units. 
Similarly, NFCs were constituted in 2000 and then in 2005. Despite a number of 
meetings on both occasions, an award could not be agreed upon. Consequently, for the 
2006 NFC all the provincial Chief Ministers vested the authority to the President to 
announce an award. As a result the President under Article 160(6) of the Constitution of 
Pakistan, through Ordinance No.1 of 2006, made amendments in the ―Distribution of 
Revenues and Grants-in-Aid Order, 1997‖, with effect from July 1, 2006. The NFC 
Award of 2009 is an achievement of the current democratically elected government as a 
consensus has been achieved after a gap of over twelve years. 
Divisible Pool Transfers: Table 2 gives composition of the divisible pool of taxes 
in terms of which taxes were shared and the proportion in which these were shared 
between the federation and the provinces combined in the last four Awards. It seems that 
the trend has been to increase the size of the divisible pool. The 1990 NFC award 
achieved this through inclusion of new taxes, specially excise duties on some 
commodities in the pool. The 1996 Award further strengthened the trend and included all 
federal taxes in the divisible pool. Since the divisible pool was substantially expanded, 
the share of provinces in the divisible taxes was reduced. The 2006 and 2009 NFCs have 
adopted the strategy of enhancing the provincial share in the divisible pool of taxes. 
 
Table 2 
Evolution of Divisible Pool in Various Awards 
Divisible Pool 
Shared Revenue Sourcesa 
NFC 
1990 
NFC 
1996 
NFC 
2006d 
NFC  
2009 
a. Income Taxb     
   Personal 80% 37.5% 45%-50% 56%-57 ½% 
   Corporate 80% 37.5% 45%-50% 56%-57 ½% 
   Wealth Tax – 87.5% 45%-50% 56%-57 ½% 
b. Sales Tax 80% 37.5% 45%-50%e 56%-57½%f 
c. Excise Duties     
   Tea – 37.5 45%-50% 56%-57 ½% 
   Tobacco 80% 37.5% 45%-50% 56%-57 ½% 
   Sugar 80% 37.5% 45%-50% 56%-57 ½% 
   Betel nut – 37.5% 45%-50% 56%-57 ½% 
   All excise duties (Excluding GST) – 37.5% 45%-50% 56%-57 ½% 
d. Export Duties     
   Cotton 80% 37.5% 45%-50% – 
   Jute – – 45%-50% – 
f. Estate and Succession Duties – – – – 
g. Capital Value Tax on 
Immovable Properties – 37.5% 45%-50% 
devolved to 
provinces 
a. Share of the provinces combined. 
b. Excluding taxes on income consisting of remuneration paid out of federal consolidated fund. 
c. Announced by the President. 
d. Provincial share was decided to be 45 percent for 1st Financial year and would reach 50 percent with 
subsequent increase of 1 percent per annum. 
e. Other than 1/5th of sales tax collected in lieu of zila/octroi transfer to be transfer to the province of origin.  
f. Sales Tax on services devolved to provinces. 
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Overall, it appears there has been an effort towards fiscal decentralisation and of 
greater transfers to the provincial governments in Pakistan which have over the years 
played an increasingly important role in the provision of basic social and economic 
services like education, health, irrigation, roads etc. in the country. 
Turning next to the revenue sharing formula between the provinces, revenues from 
the divisible pool of taxes have been distributed among provinces on the basis of their 
population. This has been fundamentally changed in the NFC Award of 2009, with 
provincial shares computed on the basis of multiple criteria of population, poverty/ 
backwardness, inverse population density (IPD) and revenue generation/ collection (see 
Table 3). In addition, the province of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (K-PK) has been given a 1 
percent share in the divisible pool prior to distribution as compensation for costs of the 
War on Terror. For the first time, revenue sharing formula in the divisible pool is being 
used to ensure a degree of fiscal equalisation through the inclusion of indicators like 
backwardness/ poverty and IPD, although the criterion of revenue generation/ collection 
mitigates against this. The derived shares of the provinces are presented in Table 4. 
 
Table 3 
Revenue Sharing Formula Among Federating Units 
Award Tax Sharing Criteria (Weight) 
NFC 1990 Divisible Taxes Population (100%) 
NFC 1996 Divisible Taxes Population (100%) 
NFC 2006 Divisible Taxes Population (100%) 
NFC 2009 Divisible Taxes Population (82%) 
Poverty (10.3%) 
Revenue (5%) 
IPD* ( 2.7%) 
*Inverse Population Density. 
 
Table 4 
Shares of Provinces from the Divisible Pool in Various Awards 
(Percent) 
Province 
NFC 
1990 
NFC 
1996 
NFC 
2006 
NFC  
2009 
Punjab 57.87 
(57.87) 
57.37 
(57.87) 
57.37 
(57.36) 
51.74 
(57.36) 
Sindh 23.29 
(23.29) 
23.29 
(23.29) 
93.71 
(23.71) 
24.55 
(23.71) 
KPK 13.54 
(13.54) 
13.54 
(13.54) 
13.82 
(13.82) 
14.62 
(13.82) 
Balochistan 5.30 
(5.30) 
5.30 
(5.30) 
5.11 
(5.11) 
9.09 
(5.11) 
Total 100.00 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Figures in brackets are population shares according to the last Census conducted prior to the Award. 
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Straight Transfers: Besides divisible pool transfers, the federal government also 
makes straight transfers to the provinces. The institution of straight transfers from the federal 
to provincial governments of development surcharge on gas, excise duty on gas and crude oil 
and net hydel profits on the basis of collection initiated in 1990 NFC award has been taken 
forward by the subsequent NFCs. In the 1996 NFC award, royalty on gas and crude oil was 
also given to the provinces. In addition, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (K-PK) was receiving net 
hydel profits from WAPDA at a capped level of Rs 6 billion annually. The 2009 NFC 
resolved the outstanding issue of arrears of net hydel profits and development surcharge on 
gas. It also altered the basis of calculating straight transfers. As a proportion of inter-
governmental transfers, straight transfers show a significant increase (see Table 5). 
 
Table 5 
Composition of Transfers from Federal to Provincial Governments 
(Rs in Billion) 
 Divisible 
Pool Transfers 
Straight 
Transfers 
Special 
Grants 
Total 
1990-91 32.1 
(95.0) 
1.7 
(5.0) 
– 
(–) 
33.8 
(100.0) 
1991-92 47.5 
(72.2) 
16.3 
(24.8) 
2.0 
(3.0) 
65.8 
(100.0) 
1996-97 119.2 
(85.5) 
18.2 
(13.1) 
2.0 
(3.0) 
139.4 
(100.0) 
1997-98 104.0 
(79.0) 
20.3 
(15.4) 
7.4 
(5.6) 
131.7 
(100.0) 
2005-06 244.6 
(77.4) 
62.8 
(19.9) 
8.7 
(2.7) 
316.0 
(100.0) 
2007-08 403.1 
(79.6) 
70.6 
(13.9) 
33.0 
(6.5) 
506.7 
(100.0) 
2009-10 574.1 
(80.0) 
87.2 
(12.1) 
57.8 
(7.9) 
689.0 
(100.0) 
2010-11 865.8 
(81.0) 
197.0* 
 (18.4) 
6.0 
(0.6) 
1068.7 
(100.0) 
Figures in parenthesis give share in total transfers. 
*Inclusive of arrears and the sales tax on services like telecommunications. 
 
Grants/Subventions: Besides revenue sharing from the divisible pool and straight 
transfers, inter-governmental transfers have also taken the form of unconditional grants in 
Pakistan. The 1990 NFC Award gave grants to the provinces to finance their revenue 
deficits. This created an incentive for provinces to increase their revenue deficits, 
undermining key principles of financial responsibility and fiscal prudence.  The 1996 
NFC award promoted the concept of grants/subventions for fiscal equalisation to smaller 
provinces. Special grants were given to the two smaller provinces equivalent to Rs 3.3 
billion for K-PK and Rs 4 billion for Balochistan. These grants, which were inflation 
indexed, were given for five years. Incentive of matching grants for higher fiscal effort to 
provincial governments was also introduced, subject to own revenue growth exceeding 
14.2 percent. A maximum limit was, however prescribed for the matching grant. 
In the 2006 NFC award, total subvention/grants for provinces were enhanced from 
Rs 8.7 billion to Rs 27.7 billion, with the provision for further increases linked to growth 
of net proceeds in the divisible pool. Punjab and Sindh which were not given any grants 
in the 1996 award, were entitled to receive Rs 3.1 and Rs 5.8 billion respectively along 
with Rs 9.7 billion and Rs 9.2 billion respectively for KPK and Balochistan. By 2009-10 
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these grants and subventions had increased almost 58 billion. The 2009 NFC has 
discontinued the use of grants/ subventions as a mechanism of transfers. Only Sindh is 
getting a Rs 6 billion grant in lieu of abolition of octroi/zila tax grant.  
In conclusion, it appears that, by and large, intergovernmental transfers between 
the federation and federating units has evolved within the broad, highly progressive 
overriding philosophy of promoting fiscal decentralisation. However, the revenue sharing 
formula to meet the differential needs of the provinces remained stagnant for a number of 
years and whatever changes were made were ad-hoc and opaque. Fiscal equalisation was 
based primarily on adhoc grants/ subventions. The 2009 NFC Award has initiated the 
practice of building in fiscal equalisation explicitly in the revenue sharing formula. It, 
therefore, becomes important to see whether or not intergovernmental transfers have been 
successful in addressing the issue of horizontal inequalities across provinces. 
 
Provincewise Trend in Federal Transfers 
The Provincial shares in total federal transfers are presented in Table 6 in the last four 
NFC awards, for years just before and after a particular award. Clear patterns emerge from the 
Table. First, the share of the largest province-Punjab has declined over time. Punjab received 
over 55 percent of federal transfers just prior to the 1990 NFC award. Thereafter its share has 
declined, showing temporary recovery prior to the 1996 NFC award. The share of Sindh has 
increased significantly in the late 90s and in the earlier part of last decade. KPK‘s share in 
transfers peaked after to the 1990 NFC award, increasing to 19 percent, and has declined 
thereafter. The 1996 NFCs did attempt to restore the province‘s share but the 2006 
arrangements further lowered it. The 2009 NFC attempts to redress this. As far as Balochistan 
is concerned, both the NFCs of 1990 and 1996 had enhanced the share in federal transfers to 
above 11 percent but this trend has not been maintained subsequently. 
 
Table 6 
Share in Total Transfers by Province 
(Percent) 
 1990- 
1991 
1991- 
1992 
1996- 
1997 
1997- 
1998 
2005- 
2006 
2007- 
2008 
2009- 
10 
2010- 
11 
Total Federal Transfers  
  (Rs in Billion) 33.8 65.8 139.4 131.7 316.0 506.7 718.3 1068.7 
Punjab 55.3 45.1 51.3 47.0 47.1 47.3 47.2 46.7 
Sindh 24.0 23.9 24.9 23.8 30.1 29.8 29.3 26.7 
KPK 12.7 19.0 15.9 17.8 14.4 14.8 15.2 17.1 
Balochistan 7.9 12.0 7.9 11.4 8.4 8.0 8.3 9.5 
Pakistan 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Table 7 
Relative* Per Capita Transfer by Province 
 1990-91 1991-92 1996-97 1997-98 2005-06 2007-08 2009-10 2010-11 
Punjab 0.953 0.778 0.884 0.810 0.821 0.824 0.822 0.815 
Sindh 1.030 1.026 1.069 1.021 1.270 1.257 1.235 1.127 
KPK 0.948 1.418 1.186 1.328 1.043 1.072 1.099 1.234 
Balochistan 1.453 2.264 1.491 2.151 1.647 1.569 1.565 1.857 
Pakistan 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
*Ratio of share in transfers to share in population. 
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Cumulative Share 
(%) in transfers A 
B 
Cumulative Share (%) in Population 
L 
450 
Given this pattern and trend, what do these transfers imply in terms of relative per 
capita transfers to each province? Table 7 gives the relative per capita transfers (defined as 
ratio of share in transfers to share in population). It appears that Punjab has always been 
getting less than its population share. Sindh has always had a share higher than its population, 
and its relative per capita transfer has, more or less, systematically increased over time except 
in the latest Award. Per capita transfers to KPK demonstrate a varying trend, increasing after 
to the 1990 and 1996 NFC awards, and declining thereafter till the 2009 NFC award. 
Balochistan has always received a higher per capita transfer than any other province. 
However, the magnitude of the transfer has varied, increasing to a high of 2.26 in 1991-92.  
Interestingly, per capita transfers to the smaller provinces have been the highest in 
the immediate aftermath of NFC awards. This implies that the awards by and large, have 
made an effort to compensate the smaller provinces for their limited fiscal capacity. The 
only exception is the 2006 ad-hoc revenue sharing arrangements when the change in 
relative per capita transfer to the smaller provinces was either minimal (KPK) or negative 
(Balochistan). As such, it is not immediately clear what the trend in fiscal equalisation 
has been in Pakistan. To answer this question we develop a Fiscal Equalisation Index 
(FEI) in the next section.  
 
5.  THE FISCAL EQUALISATION INDEX [FEI] 
The Gini Coefficient based on the Lorentz curve has traditionally been used to 
quantify the extent of income inequality. We use a similar technique to determine the extent 
of fiscal equalisation achieved by transfers. This requires a comparison of the cumulative 
share in transfers of provinces in ascending order of development with the corresponding 
cumulative share in population. This is diagrammatically shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.  
 
If curve L lies for the most part above the 45
0
 line then this indicates that fiscal 
equalisation is taking place. This requires computation of the area A below the curve L, 
for which we designate the following: 
SB, SK, SP, SS Share of Balochistan, K-PK, Punjab and Sindh respectively in transfers 
PB, PK, PP, PS Share of Balochistan, K-PK, Punjab and Sindh respectively in population 
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It is assumed that in the ascending order of level of development we have 
Balochistan, K-PK, Punjab and Sindh. This is justified in Box 2. 
 
Box 2 
Development Ranking of Provinces 
For estimation of the FEI, we need the ranking of provinces in terms of level of development. Sindh 
appears as the most developed province in almost all development indicators, with the exception of Human 
Development Index (HDI). Also, KPK and Balochistan interchange to occupy the third and the fourth rank 
in different indicators. Therefore, the ranking of provinces in ascending order of development is Balochistan, 
K-PK, Punjab, Sindh. 
  
                       Development Ranking of Provinces 
 Average 
Household 
Income a 
Per 
Capita 
GDPb 
Human 
Development 
Indexc 
Deprivation 
Indexd 
Incidence 
of 
Povertye 
Vulnerability 
to  
Povertyf 
Punjab  II II I II II II 
Sindh I I II I I I 
K-P-K IV III III IV IV III 
Balochistan III IV IV III III IV 
a According to Household Income and Expenditure. 
b According to Bangali, (2003). 
c According to Hussain, (2003) and Jamal, (2007). 
d According to Jamal, (2007). 
e According to Asian Development Bank (2003). 
f According to Jamal, (2007). 
 
The Area A is derived as follows: 
100.
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
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














  (1) 
The Fiscal Equalisation Index, FEI, is then derived as  
B
AB
FEI

   
or  
B
A
FEI 1  ... … … … … … … (2) 
Where 5000)100)(100(
2
1
B   
In the event of perfect fiscal equalisation where all the transfers accrue to the least 
developed province, we have that 
A = (100)(100) = 10000  
and FEI = –1.  
With some fiscal equalisation,  
A>B  
and –1 < FEI < 0  
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Alternatively, if there is perfect disequalisation and the most developed province 
receives all the transfers then 
A = O  
and FEI =1  
Therefore, there is fiscal disequalisation when   
O < FEI <1  
 
6.  TREND IN THE FISCAL EQUALISATION INDEX 
Based on the methodology described earlier, we have estimated the FEI for the 
years just before and after the last four NFC awards. Table 8 highlights that federal 
transfers had ceased to achieve the most important objective of fiscal equalisation by 
2005-06, prior to the 2006 Presidential order. The adhoc Presidential order did not 
reverse the trend, but in fact, strengthened it. The FEI for overall federal transfers has 
changed from –0.012 to 0.014 during the last decades. The table clearly reveals that the 
two awards—NFC 1990, 1996—were fiscally equalising, with 1990 NFC award being 
somewhat more equalising than the 1996 NFC award. Thereafter, we see that the index 
has changed sign and has become positive, indicating that federal transfers by 2005-06 
had become fiscally disequalising. The NFC award of 2009 has, however, reversed the 
trend and contributed to some fiscal equalisation. 
Table 8 also presents the FEI index by type of transfer. A number of important 
insights emerge from the analysis. First, divisible pool taxes, which account for bulk of 
federal transfers have historically been fiscally neutral, being distributed on the basis of 
population. However, the 2006 ad-hoc arrangements, which allocated part of sales tax 
(1/6 allocated in lieu of octroi/zila tax) on the basis of collection, has titled it marginally 
to being fiscally disequalising. It benefited Sindh, in particular, to the detriment of KPK 
and Balochistan.  
The 2009 NFC makes the divisible pool transfers fiscally equalising for the first 
time in the fiscal history of the country. This is because of the inclusion of the 
development indicators in the revenue sharing formula. Second, straight transfers were 
playing an important role in fiscal equalisation upto 1997-98, i.e. till after the 1996 NFC 
award. Thereafter these transfers have become an important source of inequality in 
federal transfers. The growth in the share of straight transfers, especially gas-related 
revenues to Sindh has resulted in a dramatic fall in the share of KPK and Balochistan in 
straight transfers.  
 
Table 8 
Fiscal Equalisation Index (FEI) Before and Afterwards 
 1990-91 1991-92 1996-97 1997-98 2005-06 2007-08 2009-10 2010-11 
Divisible Pool Transfers 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.020 –0.068 
Straight Transfers –0.252 –0.347 –0.220 –0.206 0.208 0.173 0.162 0.007 
Special Grants – 0.123 0.123 –0.632 –0.864 –0.420 –0.443 0.763 
Total –0.012 –0.084 –0.026 –0.067 0.017 0.011 0.014 –0.061 
∆ Due to the Award –0.072 –0.041 +0.06 –0.075 
*Ratio of share in transfers to share in population. 
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The 1996 NFC increased the importance of special grants and employed them as a 
principal tool for achieving horizontal equity, as these were given only to the two smaller 
provinces of KPK and Balochistan. Special grants in the 2006  Ad-hoc arrangements 
were also given to Sindh and Punjab which somewhat mitigated the equalising influence 
of these transfers as is reflected by the decline in the absolute magnitude of the FEI in 
2007-08 as compared to just before the award (see Table 8). 
Our analysis also clearly indicates that NFC awards have to be announced in a 
timely fashion. Fiscal equalisation breaks down or is significantly dampened close to the 
end of tenure of an award as the transfers fail to meet the resource needs of the relatively 
backward provinces. This is demonstrated by the FEI in the last year just prior to the year 
when the award is due. Lack of consensus among the federating units and the inability to 
agree upon an award leads to distortions and exacerbates fiscal inequalities. Timely 
announcement of appropriately designed revenue sharing awards promotes an important 
government objective of distribution of resources necessary for equitable provision of 
basic social and economic services. To ensure this, the NFC Secretariat at the Ministry of 
Finance has to be strengthened with capacity to collect data on basic indicators and 
undertake analysis such that the NFC deliberations are supported by more technical 
analyses and there is more frequent monitoring of the consequences of an award.  
To derive which NFC award represents the biggest change in fiscal equalisation, 
we have computed the change in FEI due to the award. The largest change has occurred 
after the 2009 NFC award. This implies that the award has made the biggest effort to 
redress the imbalance caused by the Presidential Order of 2006.  
 
7.  CONCLUSIONS 
This paper analyses the last four NFC revenue sharing arrangements from the 
viewpoint of achieving fiscal equalisation. Construction of the FEI, perhaps for the first 
time, provides clear conclusions. There was, in fact, a breakdown in fiscal equalisation in 
Pakistan prior to the 2009 NFC Award. The Ad-hoc award of 2006 announced by the 
then President had clearly failed to improve equity in intergovernmental revenue transfers 
and had, therefore, been unsuccessful in achieving its basic objective. The 1990 NFC 
award followed by 1996 and the 2009 NFC awards have, however, contributed to fiscal 
equalisation.  
Results show that the 2009 NFC award has brought about the highest change in the 
FEI and therefore has made the biggest effort at ensuring equalisation of revenues. Future 
NFCs will have to not only strengthen the trends but also have to ensure timely 
announcement of awards as our results shows dampening of fiscal equalisation towards 
the end of the tenure of a particular award. The deliberations will have to be supported 
with better and more accurate data bases and analyses on indicators and on incidence of 
the federal taxes.  
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